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UNITED NATIONS SET OF MULTILATERALLY AGREED EQUITABLE
PRINCIPLES AND RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES, GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 35/63
(1980).
The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices
(hereinafter Principles and Rules), encompassed in a resolution
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, establishes
general principles and rules for the control of restrictive business
practices (hereinafter RBPs). The principles and rules also
establish institutional mechanisms for a consultation procedure
and for the exchange of expertise and information regarding
RBPs. The resolution is based upon the recognition that RBPs can
have an adverse effect on international trade and development,
particularly for developing nations.
The records of the bodies that formulated the Principles and
Rules illustrate the classic economic battle of the haves versus the
have-nots. Effective control of RBPs, especially those of transna-
tional corporations, traditionally has been viewed by the develop-
ing nations' as an important step in the establishment of a New In-
ternational Economic Order,2 ie., in the equalization of the inter-
national economic positions of the less industrialized nations vis a
vis the advanced market economies of developed nations. The
developed nations,' on the other hand, have approached the Prin-
ciples and Rules as part of a process the objective of which is to
increase information exchange, consultation, and cooperation
among nations.4 Finally, the socialist nations5 have viewed the
formulation of the Principles and Rules as a forum for criticism of
' In 1964 UNCTAD established regional groupings of States. The appellation chosen by
the developing nations was the "Group of 77", and the name is still used today though the
developing nations now number approximately 120.
2 Joelson, The Proposed International Codes of Conduct as Related to Restrictive
Business Practices, 8 L. & POLY INT'L Bus. 837, 848-50 (1976).
1 Under the UNCTAD regional groupings of States, the industrialized market economy
nations are designated as Group B. Their number coincides with the members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
4 Davidow, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code, 13 INT'L LAW. 587, 603
(1979).
' The socialist countries, commonly referred to as Group D, consist of the members of
Comecon, with the exception of Romania, Cuba, and Mongolia.
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transnational enterprises and "private monopolistic organiza-
tions," and as a mechanism for restructuring the world economy
to eliminate "discrimination, inequality ... and exploitation."6 The
challenge that confronted the drafters of the various proposals
and of the final Principles and Rules was to resolve these basic dif-
ferences in approach and to formulate a workable international
solution to the problem of RBPs.
RBPs have long been a subject of both national and interna-
tional concern.! The development of international rules related to
RBPs originated with the studies of possible controls for cartels
and industrial agreements.' United Nations efforts in this area
began with the 1948 proposal and subsequent rejection of the
Havana Charter, which called for an international trade organiza-
tion.' A United Nations committee under the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) drafted a convention in 1953, which paralleled
the Havana Charter's list of RBPs and substantive law and pro-
vided for implementation procedures. These guidelines failed. 10
However, the issue of RBPs was also explored by the contracting
parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in
the late 1950s, but it was concluded that RBP controls could not
be incorporated effectively into the structure of GATT."
Nonetheless, one result of the study was the establishment of a
governmental consultation procedure for contracting parties to
GATT. It was foreseen that the harmful effects of RBPs involving
enterprises of contracting parties would be resolved using this
procedure.'2
In 1972, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) established an ad hoc Group of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices, 3 which was charged with identify-
' Report of the Third ad hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on its
Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. TD/250, TDIB/C.2/201, TD/B/C.6/20 (1979) at 40 [hereinafter
cited as Report of the Third ad Hoc Advisory Group].
' Joelson & Griffin, International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices Engaged
in by Transnational Enterprises: A Prognosis, 11 INT'L LAW. 5 (1977). "Since 1945 more
than 20 nations have enacted restrictive business practices legislation." Id at 9. See
Greenhill, UNCTAD: Control of Restrictive Business Practices, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 67,
68-70 (1978). See generally Furnish, A Transnational Approach to Restrictive Business
Practices, 4 INT'L LAW. 317 (1969).
Furnish, supra note 7, at 318-20; Joelson & Griffin, supra note 7, at 10.
Davidow, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code, 13 INT'L LAW. 587 (1979);
Furnish, supra note 7, at 322-26; Joelson & Griffin, supra note 7, at 10.
0 Furnish, supra note 7, at 326-27; Joelson & Griffin, supra note 7, at 11.
' Furnish, supra note 7, at 327-29; Joelson & Griffin, supra note 7, at 11-12.
'z This consultation procedure has never been used. See Davidow, supra note 4, at 587.
UNCTAD Res. 73 (III), U.N. Doc TD/180 (May 9, 1972).
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ing restrictive business practices, submitting recommendations
for their alleviation or possible elimination, studying further those
RBPs adversely affecting developing countries, and examining the
possibility of promulgating guidelines for governments regarding
RBPs. This group of experts reported to the Committee on
Manufactures."4 A second ad hoc Group of Experts met in 1975
and 1976.1 The General Assembly's resolution supporting the ef-
forts of the ad hoc Group was considered "an endorsement and a
step forward regarding the type of desirable remedial action." 16
However, as reflected in the Report of the Second ad hoc Group of
Experts, there was a sharp division of opinion between the
developed and developing nations on a number of important
issues, including the ultimate result to be achieved by the control
of RBPs, 7 the scope of the principles to be adopted, 8 and the iden-
" Report by the ad hoc Group of Experts, Restrictive Business Practices in Relation to
Trade and Development, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/119, at 1 (1973).
5 See Report of the Second ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/600, TD/B/C.2/166, TD/B/C.2/AC.5/6 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Report of
the Second ad hoc Group].
" Id. Ch. 115, introductory statement of the representative of the Secretary-General of
UNCTAD, which "referred to resolution 3362 (S-VII) of the General Assembly, which
stated that 'restrictive business practices adversely affecting international trade, par-
ticularly that of developing countries, should be eliminated and efforts should be made at
the national and international levels with the objective of negotiating a set of equitable
principles and rules."' I&
17 Experts from developed countries viewed the control of RBPs as "aimed essentially at
maintaining and promoting competition," while experts from developing nations stressed
that the goal should be that of "controlling all restrictive business practices likely to affect
adversely the economies of developing countries." Id. at 11-9-10, 11-13. The experts from
developing countries also emphasized the necessity for careful consideration of exemptions,
and "the concept of more favourable and differentiated treatment." Id. at 15. In the words
of one expert, "[c]ompetition ... presuppose[s] some sort of essential equality amongst the
parties concerned .. " Id. at 7.
Joelson and Griffin review successful international agreements concerning RBPs, in-
cluding the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community and the Invest-
ment Code of the Andean Common Market. The authors conclude that the history shows
that successful international attempts to control RBPs have been among countries at the
same level of development. Joelson & Griffin, supra note 7, at 12-14. See also Report of the
Second ad hoc Group, supra note 9, at 15. Therefore, some "equalization" between the
developed and developing nations would seem to be essential to the success of a U.N. effort
to control RBPs.
" Experts from developed countries preferred the development of "co-operation and im-
provement in the exchange of information." Report of the Second ad hoc Group, supra note
15, at II-10. Also favored was a "general rather than a detailed approach." Id. at II-11. Not
surprisingly, obligatory principles were not favored. Id. at II-10. See Gill, The UNCTAD-
Restrictive Business Practices Code: A Code for Competition?, 13 INT'L LAW. 607-15 (1979).
Experts from developing countries, while agreeing that exchange of resources and infor-
mation regarding RBPs was important, regarded as essential the establishment of a "man-
datory Code of Conduct." Report of the Second ad hoc Group, supra note 15, at 11-8. See
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tification of what practices should be categorized as restrictive
business practices. 9
At its fourth session in May 1976, UNCTAD formally called for
action, on an international level, to formulate, within the
framework of UNCTAD, "a set of multilaterally agreed equitable
principles and rules for the control of restrictive business prac-
tices having adverse effects on international trade, particularly
that of developing countries, and on the economic development of
those countries."' The conference also urged that the exchange,
collection, and dissemination of information on RBPs by the
UNCTAD Secretariat be continued. It stressed the special need
for the exchange of information supplied by the developed coun-
tries,"' for the provision of technical assistance regarding RBPs, 2
and for the development of a model law or laws on RBPs.23 Most
importantly, the conference called for the convening of further
meetings of the ad hoc Group of Experts.
The Third ad hoc Group met each year from 1976 to 1979. Dur-
ing these sessions, it completed a "multilaterally agreed" set of
"equitable princples and rules" which, unfortunately, embodied
several significant areas of disagreement. The areas of agreement
included objectives of the Principles and Rules,24 definitions of im-
portant terms,25 a substantially complete list of restrictive prac-
tices likely to be injurious to trade and development, the need for
a system of information gathering and dissemination of expert
assistance to facilitate the development of legislation, and the
desire for concerted action on national and regional levels2 6 as
generally Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary
Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72
AM. J. INT'L L. 247. See also Davidow, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law
in a Changing World, 8 L. & POLY INT'L Bus. 895, 910 (1976).
" A major point of difference between developed and developing countries regarding the
identification of RBPs was the characterization of parent-subsidiary practices, including ex-
clusive dealing, refusals to deal, and territorial market and product allocation, as RBPs. See
text at pp. 717-19 infra. Report of the Second ad hoc Group, supra note 15 at 111-19. See
Davidow, The United States, Developing Countries, and the Issue of Intra-Enterprise
Agreements, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 507, 511-12 (1977); Gill, supra note 18, at 612-15.
' UNCTAD Res. 96, U.N. Doc. TD/218, at § III, 3(a) (May 31, 1976).
21 Id. at (b)-(d).
Id. at (e).
" Id. at (fW.
' Report of the Third ad hoc Group, supra note 6, at 4-6.
' Id. at 7-8. The Group D countries continued to object to the inclusion of enterprises
controlled by the State in the definition of enterprises and to the absence of a definition of
cartels. Id. at 5.
26 Id. at 11-13.
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well as a set of general principles." Unresolved issues were listed
in a closing statement by experts representing the Group of 77.
These issues were characterized as involving "essentially political
decisions and hence [ones which] could only be resolved at the
negotiating conference.''2
On the recommendation of the Trade and Development Board,
the General Assembly convened the United Nations Conference
on Restrictive Business Practices in November 1979 to negotiate
and adopt a set of principles and rules consistent with the work of
the Group of Experts." After a second session in April 1980, the
Conference adopted a resolution for transmittal to the General
Assembly entitled The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Prac-
tices, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly
on December 5, 1980. 30
The first section of the Principles and Rules presents a state-
ment of objectives, directed principally at developing countries.
Included among the objectives are the following: ensuring that
RBPs do not impede or negate the realization of benefits to be
gained from the liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers af-
fecting world trade;3 attaining greater efficiency in international
trade and development (through, for example, the control of con-
centration of economic power and through the fostering of com-
petition and innovation);32 protecting social welfare in general and
the interests of consumers in particular; 3  eliminating the disad-
Id. at 17.
28 Report of the Third ad hoc Group, supra note 6, at 35. Examples listed include:
(a) exceptions to the application of the principles and rules; (b) differential treat-
ment for enterprises of developing countries; (c) the inclusion of restrictive
business practices occurring in the relations between the various entities con-
stituting a transnational corporation; (d) the role of UNCTAD in implementing
and monitoring the principles and rules and in further work generally on the
question of restrictive business practices; (e) the legally binding nature of the
principles and rules.
For a detailed study of the text and outstanding issues as negotiated by the ad hoc Commit-
tee of Experts and transmitted to the Conference, see Davidow, The UNCTAD Restrictive
Business Practices Code, 13 INT'L LAW. 587 (1979).
" Documents relating to the draft set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and
rules for the control of restrictive business practices, circulated at the first session, 19
November to 8 December 1979, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/8 at 2 [hereinafter cited as
Documents relating to the draft].
30 G.A. Res. 35/63.
31 Id. at §A(1).
2 Id. at (2).
Id. at (3).
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vantages of the RBPs of transnational corporations and other
enterprises;' providing guidelines and principles for adoption at
the international level; and facilitating the adoption of effective
laws and policies at the regional and national levels. 5
The second section of the Principles and Rules provides a defini-
tion of terms36 and delineates the scope of the document. 7 The
scope of application section includes part of a compromised solu-
tion to important issues left unresolved at the Expert level, where
it was agreed that the Principles and Rules would apply to all
transactions in goods and services to all enterprises, and to all
countries regardless of whether the RBPs involve enterprises in
one or more countries. 8 The issue of exemptions from application
of the principles was to be resolved at the Conference. The Group
B countries proposed that the Principles and Rules should be ap-
plicable neither to acts acceptable under national legislation or
regulations nor to RBPs directly caused by sovereign acts of state
or authorized by intergovernmental agreements among concerned
countries.
Most importantly, Group B proposed that the Principles and
Rules should not be applicable to agreements between parent and
subsidiary companies unless amounting to an abuse of dominant
power in a relevant market. 9 The Group of 77 developing coun-
tries proposed that exemptions from the application of the Prin-
ciples and Rules should be granted only under legislation and
regulation of the developing countries to activities or enterprises
"essential for their economic development or in defense of their
primary commodities and economic resources. 40 According to the
Group of 77 proposal, only RBPs directly caused by intergovern-
mental agreements negotiated within the auspices of the United
Nations would be exempt from the application of the Principles
and Rules." As negotiated at the Conference, these conflicting
positions on scope of application are not included in this section
but are resolved in Section C on equitable principles.42 In the final
Id at (4).
Id at (5).
Id. §B(i). The terms defined are: (1) "restrictive business practices"; (2) "dominant posi-
tion of market power"; and (3) "enterprises."
Id. at (ii).
Report of the Third ad hoc Group, supra note 6, at 11.
Id at 12-13.
Id at 12.
Report of the Third ad hoc Group, supra note 6, at 13.
42 See text accompanying notes 47-51 infra.
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document, the only complete exemption from application of the
Principles and Rules is for intergovernmental agreements.43
The third section of the Principles and Rules, section C, con-
tains the equitable principles. In the final text, the principles are
divided into three subsections. This division represents the result
of negotiation of a major issue at the Conference, namely, whether
differential treatment should be afforded the enterprises of
developing countries. The position of the Group of 77 at the Ex-
pert level was that preferential treatment should be given to their
national enterprises to ensure equitable application of the Prin-
ciples and Rules.'5 However, the Group B position was that ac-
count should be taken of special economic conditions or cir-
cumstances, particularly in developing countries, to ensure
equitable interpretation.'6
At the Conference, the Group of 77 stressed that inequality of
market power necessitates preferential treatment for developing
countries. This is true, they urged, because developing countries'
enterprises "are ... the recipients of the effects of [RBPs]... [not]
the instigators of them." Furthermore, because they are new en-
trants, it was asserted such enterprises have a difficult time mak-
ing gains in markets against enterprises of developed countries,
which "have an entrenched position ... buttressed by the use of
restrictive business practices.""' Rather than to provide excep-
43 Principles and Rules, supra note 30, §(B)(ii)(9). The Principles and Rules also provide that
references to "states" or "governments" include regional groupings having competence in
the area of RBPs. Id §B(ii)(8). An example is the European Economic Community.
" See note 40 supra.
'5 The text proposed by the Group of 77 stated that "account should be taken of the
economic conditions ... and the frequent absence of countervailing market power of enter-
prises of those countries to that of enterprises of developed countries, especially transna-
tional corporations, and accordingly preferential or differential treatment should be afford-
ed to their national enterprises in order to ensure the equitable application of the principles
and rules." Report of the Third ad hoc Group, supra note 6, at 15. See also the exemption
proposed under Section (B) of the Principles and Rules, supra note 30.
" Special conditions or economic circumstances under the Group B proposal included
"the need for small and medium-sized enterprises to co-operate and combine sufficiently to
enable them to function efficiently and competitively in international markets." Report of
the Third ad hoc Group, supra note 6, at 15.
47 Documents relating to the draft, supra note 29, at 4 (statement on the Position of the
Group of 77 made by Brazil on behalf of the Group of 77 at the second plenary meeting, on
21 November 1975). Further support of the Group of 77 position for preferential treatment
as part of the transformation of the "old international economic relationship" was ex-
pressed by China in its statement, which noted that according to United Nations statistics,
the industrial output of the developing countries, which account for over.70 per
cent of the world's population, amounted to only 8 per cent of total world in-
dustrial production in 1975, and increased to only 9 per cent in 1977. The develop-
19811
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tions to the rules for the enterprises of developing countries,
Group B countries urged that the Principles and Rules be applied
universally, although they conceded that consideration should be
given to the adverse effects of RBPs upon developing countries."
The first subsection of the agreed text contains the general
principles as negotiated by the Experts. 9 The second and third
subsections incorporate a compromise between the positions of
the Group of 77 and Group B. There are no provisions for any ab-
solute exceptions from application of the Principles and Rules. In-
stead, the second subsection stresses that although nations should
"bear in mind the need to ensure comprehensive application" of
the Principles and Rules to enterprises, they should take into ac-
count the conduct of enterprises accepted or required by national
law.5 The third subsection regarding preferential or differential
treatment for developing countries stresses that states, par-
ticularly developed countries, should take into account the
development, financial, and trade needs of developing countries
for the purpose of encouraging economic development through the
promotion of domestic industries.5
Section D embodies the Principles and Rules for enterprises.
With minor exceptions, the text to which the Experts agreed re-
mained unchanged at the Conference level. Section D contains the
following principles: (1) enterprises should conform to the restric-
tive business practices laws of the countries in which they
operate; (2) enterprises should consult and cooperate with compe-
tent authorities in the countries in which they operate, and should
provide information, particularly details of restrictive
ing countries' share of trade in manufactured goods is only 8 per cent of the world
total. These figures are an eloquent illustration of the present disadvantaged
position of the developing countries in international economic capital.
Id. at 8-9.
" I& at 6. (Statement on the position of Group B made by Canada on behalf of the
members of Group B at the second plenary meeting, on 21 November 1975).
" Principles and Rules supra note 30 §C(i). These general principles include: (1) taking ap-
propriate action in a mutually reinforcing manner at national, regional, and international
levels to eliminate or effectively deal with RBPs; (2) establishing collaboration between
governments at bilateral and multilateral levels to facilitate the control of RBPs; (3) devis-
ing appropriate mechanisms to facilitate exchange and dissemination of information among
governments with respect to RBPs; (4) facilitating multilateral consultations on policy
issues relating to the control of RBPs; (4) not construing the Principles and Rules as justify-
ing conduct by enterprises that is unlawful under applicable national or regional legislation.
M ' I & § C (iii).
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agreements, even if that information is located in foreign coun-
tries, unless its disclosure is prevented by law or established
public policy; and (3) enterprises, except those under common con-
trol, should refrain from practices that limit access to markets or
otherwise unduly restrain competition. Such practices include: (a)
fixing prices, including those of exports and imports; (b) collusive
tendering; (c) market or customer allocation; (d) allocation by
quota of sales and production; (e) concerted refusals to deal; (f) con-
certed refusal of supplies to potential importers; and (g) collective
denial of access to an arrangement or association crucial to com-
petition. A fourth principle is that enterprises should refrain from
the abuse of a dominant position of market power. Such activities
include (a) predatory behavior toward competitors; (b)
discriminatory pricing or terms or conditions in the supply or pur-
chase of goods or services, including, for example, differential
pricing between affiliated enterprises; (c) mergers, takeovers,
joint ventures, or other acquisitions of control; (d) fixing the prices
for resale of exported goods in importing countries; and (e)
restricting the importation of legitimately trademarked goods
identical or similar to trademarked goods in the importing coun-
try when the trademarks are of the same origin and where the
purpose of restricting importation is to maintain artificially high
prices. Whether the activities listed above are considered to be
abusive is determined by examination of the purpose and effects
of the activities in a particular situation. Subsection (4)(f) lists four
practices from which enterprises should refrain when they are not
used for legitimate business purposes such as ensuring quality,
safety, adequate distribution, or service. These practices are (i)
refusals to deal on customary commercial terms, (ii) exclusive
dealing, (iii) restricting resale, customers, or export of goods, and
(iv) tying arrangements.2
During the development of the Principles and Rules relating to
transactions between affiliated enterprises, disagreement arose as
to what actions by enterprises should be considered restrictive.'
It should be noted that the terms "restrictive business practices"
and "antitrust" are not equivalent, and that what may constitute a
restrictive business practice in, for example, the European
Economic Community may not be an antitrust violation in the
52 I& §D 1-4.
s See text accompanying notes 13-19 supra.
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United States.' Nevertheless, the Western market economy coun-
tries generally agree that parent-subsidiary agreements are not in
themselves restrictive business practices.5 The developing na-
tions, on the other hand, consider intra-enterprise agreements to
be a major source of harmful RBPs, and thus favor the elimination
of such arrangements. At the first Conference session, a
spokesman, in emphasizing the importance of making intra-
enterprise transactions using RBPs subject to the Principles and
Rules, noted that "roughly fifty percent of world trade is between
related enterprises. Hence, to exclude such transactions from the
scope of the principles and rules would seriously impair its [sic]
value and effectiveness."57 In final form, section D(3) of the Prin-
ciples and Rules excludes enterprises "when dealing with each
other in the context of an economic entity wherein they are under
common control" from the application of the section, which lists
prohibited horizontal offenses. However, all enterprises,58 in-
cluding parents and subsidiaries, are subject to §D(4), which lists
abuses of dominant position. Whether the conduct listed is con-
sidered an abuse is determined "in the light of the organizational,
managerial, and legal relationship among the enterprises con-
cerned. . . ."' This compromise reflects the previously "misunder-
stood" Group B position as presented by Davidow, who states that
all rules for enterprises -rules against price-fixing, tying ar-
rangements, and the like-are fully and expressly applicable to
transnational corporations when such firms fix prices with com-
peting firms or place tied products or services on independent
buyers ... [and] when a transnational corporation acts abusively
through a subsidiary or affiliate to produce adverse competitive
See Davidow, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law in a Changing
World, 8 L. & POLY INT'L Bus. 895, 901 (1976).
' Id See also Davidow, The United States, Developing Countries and the Issue of Intra-
Enterprise Agreements, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 507 (1977), where the author analyzes the
state of United States and EEC law on parent-subsidiary relationships, pointing out that
there are "complex and debatable" issues "even under (such) well settled and relatively con-
servative bodies of antitrust law .. " Id at 508.
" Id. at 512.
" Documents relating to the draft, supra note 29, at 4. (Statement on the position of the
Group of 77 made by Brazil on behalf of the Group of 77 at the second plenary meeting on
21 November 1979). See also id. at 3 (statement by China on its position, made at the sec-
ond plenary meeting, on 21 November 1979); Report of the Third ad hoc Group, supra note
6, at 40. (Statement of the spokesman for the experts from Group D).
" The definition of enterprises includes "corporations ... and ... their branches, sub-
sidiaries, affiliates, or other entities directly or indirectly controlled by them." Principles
and Rules, supra note 30, §B(3).
5' Id. at § D(4).
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effects outside the group or entrench a dominant market posi-
tion."
The fifth section of the Principles and Rules, section E, sets out
the actions that nations should take and the principles they should
follow at the national, regional, and subregional levels. These are:
(1) adopting and enforcing appropriate legislation and ad-
ministrative procedures for the control of RBPs; (2) basing such
legislation on the principle of regulating behavior which, through
abuse of dominant position, limits market access or unduly
restrains competition, has adverse effects on trade or economic
development, or which through agreements among enterprises
has the same effect; (3) ensuring fair and equitable treatment of
enterprises on the same basis and in accordance with established
legal procedures; (4) seeking remedial or protective measures to
prevent the use of RBPs that adversely affect international trade
and development, particularly of developing countries; (5)
safeguarding information obtained from enterprises containing
legitimate business secrets; (6) instituting or improving pro-
cedures for obtaining information from enterprises; (7)
establishing regional and sub-regional mechanisms for exchange
of information on RBPs; (8) sharing expertise in control of RBPs
with other States; and (9) supplying information to other States,
particularly to developing countries."
Section F of the Principles and Rules relates to international
measures and advocates collaboration aimed at eliminating or ef-
fectively dealing with RBPs through specific actions. These in-
clude working to achieve common approaches in national policies,
communicating annually to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD,
publishing an annual UNCTAD report, continuing work on a
model law or laws, and implementing technical assistance, ad-
visory and training programs on RBPs.62
The most important provision establishes a procedure for con-
sultation among States," which are directed to "accord full con-
sideration to requests for consultations.6 4 If developing countries
use the consultation procedure, application of the Principles and
Rules to the actions of enterprises from the developed countries
"0 Davidow, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code, 13 INT'L LAW. 587, 599
(1979).
81 Principles and Rules, supra note 30, §E(1-9).
Id. at §F(1-3, 5-7).
Id. §F(4).
Id. §F(4)(b).
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may be enhanced, especially when national legislation and
regional agreements are based upon the Principles and Rules.
The final section of the Principles and Rules deals with the in-
ternational institutional machinery for giving effect to the Prin-
ciples and Rules. The section establishes an Intergovernmental
Group of Experts on RBPs, which operates within the framework
of UNCTAD. The purposes of the Group are to provide a forum
for consultations, to undertake and encourage studies and
research, to collect and disseminate information, and to make
reports and recommendations. It is not empowered to act as a
tribunal or to pass judgment in regard to specific business trans-
actions. The Group is specifically directed to "avoid becoming in-
volved when enterprises in a specific business transaction are in
dispute."6
The adoption of the Principles and Rules by the General
Assembly and the establishment of institutional machinery in the
form of a consultative and information-gathering, non-judicial
body resolves an issue long debated; i.e., the legal nature of the
Principles and Rules. Throughout the negotiations and meetings
of the Group of Experts, the developing countries maintained that
the proposed Principles and Rules should be binding.6 The
developed world, conversely, insisted that principles for enter-
prises and for States should be voluntary. 7 As adopted, the Prin-
ciples and Rules follow the proposal of the developed countries.
They were adopted as a United Nations resolution rather than as
a convention to be ratified by each signatory State, and the in-
stitutional framework expressly excludes international enforce-
ment and adjudication mechanisms.
In practice, the distinction between "binding" and "voluntary"
's Id §G(i-ii). The third subsection provides for a review procedure five years after the
adoption of the Principles and Rules.
Report of the Second ad hoc Group, supra note 15, at 76: "those principles applying to
the activities of enterprises should not be voluntary since it . . . (is) the responsibility of
governments to enforce restrictive business practice laws as regards the operations of
enterprises beyond their national frontiers." Id.
67 Id. At paragraph 73 it is stated that
principles for governments should be voluntary because of the greatly varying
states of development among members of the United Nations and the divergen-
cies in approaches to restrictive business practices, a field in which many member
countries . . . (have) no legislation or little experience. ...
Principles for enterprises should also be voluntary. The experts from the developed
market economy countries also noted the lack of international enforcement mechanisms and
the unlikelihood, given the divergence in national objectives, that countries would create
and accept any binding international enforcement and adjudication. Id
[Vol. 11:3
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probably will not weaken the effect of the Principles and Rules,
since the consensus reached affords the resolution "considerable
moral force, '" regardless of whether it is considered to have the
force of international law."9 In particular, the mechanisms
established for increased exchange of information and expertise"
should have a positive effect. Furthermore, the anticipated incor-
poration of the Principles and Rules into national legislation and
regional agreements of developing nations should eventually give
the Principles and Rules legal effect.71
Schaun Griffin
" Id. at 177.
" Davidow & Chiles, supra note 18, at 256 n.51.
"o See text accompanying note 66 supra.
" See Davidow & Chiles, supra note 18, at 256; and Joelson, supra 2, at 870-71.

